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Recessions and Recoveries
T
the behavior of groups of leading, coincident, and
lagging indicators in the first seven months of six
recoveries (the earliest being that following the
trough in July 1924, the latest being that following
the trough in August 1954, since revised to May
1954) and tentatively concluded that “recoveries
in output, employment, and profits have usually
been faster after severe depressions than after
mild contractions” (p. 88). Moore (1965) contains
a restatement of the finding that severe contractions
tend to be followed by strong expansions, and
Bry and Boschan (1971) present further evidence
on this proposition, focusing on growth in non-
agricultural employment.
Another of the few authors addressing this
question is Milton Friedman, who asked, “Is the
magnitude of an expansion related systematically
to the magnitude of the succeeding contraction?
Does a boom tend on the average to be followed
by a large contraction? A mild expansion, by a
mild contraction?” (Friedman 1969, 271). On the
basis of an examination of simple rank correlation
coefficients for three different measures of activity,
Friedman found no relationship between the size
of an expansion and the size of the succeeding con-
traction but did find that “a large contraction in out-
put tends to be followed on the average by a large
business expansion; a mild contraction, by a mild
he U.S. economy entered recession in July
1990 and began to recover, many analysts
believe, in April or May 1991. Since then, the
economy has grown at a pace so sluggish as to be
indistinguishable, in some ways, from continued
recession. However, as early as spring 1991, several
observers were expressing the opinion that the
recovery from the 1990–91 recession would not
be particularly robust because the recession itself
was not particularly severe. For example, in Busi-
ness Week in June 1991, Alan Blinder argued,
“Shallow recessions are followed by weak recov-
eries for a simple reason: An economy that has
not fallen far has little catching up to do. And
catch-up is the main reason economies zoom
upward in the early stages of recovery.” The
Economist magazine, in an editorial on January
18, 1992, pointed out that “there are good reasons
to think that the coming expansion may be weaker
than most of its predecessors,” the main one being
“the mildness of the recession that preceded it.”
Most recently, the Shadow Open Market Commit-
tee, an independent private group that critiques
the actions of the Federal Reserve, argued that
one of the main reasons the economy remained
sluggish in 1992 was that “modest recessions are
usually followed by modest recoveries” (1992, 5).
The notion that the economy experiences a
“bounce-back” or “rubber-band” effect following
declines in economic activity contains a certain
amount of intuitive appeal but seems to have
been subject to few empirical tests. The earliest
study and one of the most comprehensive analyses
of this issue that we have found is Moore (1961),
who tried to test the view that “the strength of a
recovery in its early stages depends upon the
level from which it starts” (p. 86). He examined
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expansion” (p. 273). Friedman went further, to sketch
out a theory of business cycles (the “plucking
model of fluctuations”) that he felt was consistent
with these patterns in activity, but to date his
model seems to have received scant attention.
Finally, we note that Neftci (1986), in the
course of addressing a slightly different question,
reports results that are relevant to the recession–
recovery relationship. Focusing on the behavior
of pig iron production since the latter half of the
nineteenth century, he finds a significant negative
correlation between the length of expansions and
the length of contractions: for every additional
twelve months of expansion, the economy experi-
ences 1.8 fewer months of contraction. However,
the length of contractions does not affect the length
of subsequent expansions. Furthermore, he shows
that there is a significant relationship between the
peak-to-trough decline in output and the increase
over the course of the subsequent expansion but
none between the gains in output over the expan-
sion and the losses over the subsequent contraction.
In this article, we will study the behavior of
output during and immediately after recessions to
see whether there is any validity to the notion of a
bounce-back effect.1 Our analysis differs from that
of Moore, Friedman, and Neftci in a number of
ways. First, we focus on the behavior of industrial
production rather than look at a variety of indica-
tors. The reason is that we can obtain reasonably
consistent estimates of industrial production for
long periods, allowing us to look at recoveries
from a large number of recessions. Second, we
estimate a simple linear regression model rather
than look at simple correlations, which enables us
to discriminate between the effects of different
measures of the severity of the preceding recession.
The two measures of severity we focus on here
are the depth of the recession, as measured by the
output loss from the peak date to the trough date,
and the length of the recession, as measured by
the number of months from the peak date to the
trough date. Third, we look at a larger number of
recessions and recoveries than does either Moore
or Friedman, including a number of pre–World
War I business cycles. Each recession will be
viewed as an independent event, and we will look
for regularities common to the 23 recessions and
recoveries that the United States has experienced
over the past hundred years. Fourth, we only look
at output growth in the early stages of an expan-
sion (either the first six months or the first twelve
months) and see how growth over this horizon is
influenced by the severity of the preceding reces-
sion. This contrasts with Friedman’s and Neftci’s
examination of the relationship between growth
over the entire expansion and the severity of the
preceding recession.
The article begins with a brief discussion of
how the National Bureau of Economic Research
(NBER) determines the dates of the peaks and
troughs in economic activity that give the business
cycle its name. We then specify a simple empirical
model for testing hypotheses about the relation-
ship between recessions and expansions. We docu-
ment the existence of a significant bounce-back
effect in various measures of U.S. industrial pro-
duction and show that this finding is robust to a
variety of potential criticisms. Having established
the existence of a bounce-back effect, we provide
some intuition about the economic forces behind
it. We then consider the behavior of the economy
during the recovery from the 1990–91 recession
and show that it is consistent with the bounce-
back effect.
The U.S. experience with recessions
The NBER is responsible for the dating of the
peaks and troughs in economic activity that mark
the onset of recessions and expansions.2 The dating
of business cycles by the NBER is based on a
definition of business cycles first formulated by
Wesley Clair Mitchell in 1927:
1 Sichel (1992) also talks about a bounce-back effect follow-
ing recessions in reference to a high-growth recovery
phase at the beginning of an expansion but does not look
at the relationship between the rate of growth during the
recovery phase and output losses during the recession. He
does, however, examine the predictive power of an output-
gap variable for GNP growth, where the output-gap variable
is defined as the deviation of GNP (gross national product)
from its preceding peak value.
2 Interested readers are referred to Moore and Zarnowitz
(1986) for a detailed discussion of how the NBER dates
business cycles. The discussion here is a very brief sum-
mary of their article.Economic Review — First Quarter 1993 3
Business cycles are a type of fluctuation
found in the aggregate economic activity of
nations that organize their work mainly in
business enterprises: a cycle consists of
expansions occurring at about the same
time in many economic activities, followed
by similarly general recessions, contrac-
tions, and revivals which merge into the
expansion phase of the next cycle; the
sequence of changes is recurrent but not
periodic; in duration business cycles vary
from more than one year to ten or twelve
years; they are not divisible into shorter
cycles of similar character with amplitudes
approximating their own (Moore and
Zarnowitz 1986, 736).
Note that the definition refers to fluctuations in
“aggregate economic activity” rather than a more
precisely defined aggregate, such as gross national
product (GNP), industrial production, or total em-
ployment. This vagueness is intentional and recog-
nizes that business cycles consist of movements in
many different series that are not readily reduced
to a single aggregate. Looking at a variety of series
also helps minimize the risk of drawing erroneous
conclusions based on mismeasurement. Finally,
under the NBER definition, a period of slow, or
“subpar,” growth does not qualify as a contrac-
tion. Rather, peaks in activity are followed by
periods of absolute decline in aggregate activity.3
A recession is defined as a peak-to-trough
movement in economic activity. According to the
NBER business-cycle chronology, the United
States has experienced 30 recessions since the
middle of the nineteenth century (see Burns and
Mitchell 1946, Table 16; Moore and Zarnowitz
1986, Tables A.3, A.5). The dates of the peaks and
troughs in U.S. economic activity chosen by the
NBER are given in Table 1, along with statistics on
the duration of expansions and contractions for
the entire period. The chronology ends with the
date of the most recent peak, July 1990.
At the time of our analysis (October 1992),
the date of the trough marking the end of the
most recent recession had not been announced
officially, but several observers (including Moore
1992) have placed it in April or May 1991.4
Addi-tional clues to the likely date of the most
recent trough can be obtained from examining
the recent behavior of the U.S. Commerce
Department’s composite index of coincident
indicators. This index is explicitly designed to
approximate cyclical movements in economic
activity and to have turning points that match
the business cycle. The coincident index
peaked most recently in June 1990, just one
month before the official peak in July, and
seemed to hit a trough in January 1992. How-
ever, revisions to the index currently being
undertaken by the Commerce Department and
discussed in Green and Beckman (1992) move
the trough in the index back to March 1991.
From the table we can see that the United
States has experienced nine recessions since the
end of World War II. This is a rather small sample
for testing the idea that severe recessions tend to
be followed by strong recoveries, so it is impor-
tant to include pre–World War II recessions in our
sample to be reasonably confident of our find-
ings.5 However, extending the statistical analysis
to the pre–World War II period leads to problems
of data availability and consistency. Furthermore,
because the NBER chronology dates business-
cycle peaks and troughs by month, a monthly
indicator of economic activity is preferable for
examining the hypothesis that deep recessions
are followed by strong recoveries.
The requirement that the selected measure
of aggregate economic activity be available at a
monthly frequency and extend back to the prewar
period leads us to use industrial production, as
measured by the Federal Reserve Board’s index of
industrial production.6 This index has the advan-
3 This is not true, however, of “growth cycle” chronologies.
4 See Hall (1992) for a discussion of the problem of determin-
ing the date of troughs in economic activity.
5 Alternatively, we could look at the experience of other
countries in the postwar period. Thus, in Balke and Wynne
(1992), we look for a bounce-back effect in the Group of
Seven countries during the postwar period, using the NBER’s
“growth cycle” chronology for these countries.
6 Moore (1961, 88) notes that the relationship between the
severity of a recession and the strength of the subsequent
recovery is strongest for industrial production.Federal Reserve Bank of Dallas 4
Table 1
NBER Business-Cycle Chronology for United States
Duration (Months)
Peak Trough Contraction Expansion
June 1857 December 1858 18 22
October 1860 June 1861 8 46
April 1865 December 1867 32 18
June 1869 December 1870 18 34
October 1873 March 1879 65 36
March 1882 May 1885 38 22
March 1887 April 1888 13 27
July 1890 May 1891 10 20
January 1893 June 1894 17 18
December 1895 June 1897 18 24
June 1899 December 1900 18 21
September 1902 August 1904 23 33
May 1907 June 1908 13 19
January 1910 January 1912 24 12
January 1913 December 1914 23 44
August 1918 March 1919 7 10
January 1920 July 1921 18 22
May 1923 July 1924 14 27
October 1926 November 1927 13 21
August 1929 March 1933 43 50
May 1937 June 1938 13 80
February 1945 October 1945 8 37
November 1948 October 1949 11 45
July 1953 May 1954 10 39
August 1957 April 1958 8 24
April 1960 February 1961 10 106
December 1969 November 1970 11 36
November 1973 March 1975 16 58
January 1980 July 1980 6 12
July 1981 November 1982 16 92
July 1990 n.a.   n.a.   n.a.
Comparative statistics
Average length Average length
of contractions of expansions
Pre–World War II 21.2 28.9
Post–World War II 10.7 49.9
n.a.—Not available.
NOTE: Length of contraction is the number of months from peak to trough.
Length of expansion is the length of the expansion after the trough date.
SOURCE: Moore and Zarnowitz (1986), Tables A.3, A.5.Economic Review — First Quarter 1993 5
tage of extending back to 1919, thus adding to the
sample of recessions. The obvious drawback is
that industrial production is an incomplete indicator
of aggregate economic activity: industrial produc-
tion currently accounts for only about one-fifth
of total output. Looking at a broader measure
of output, such as GNP, would probably be
better; however, GNP estimates are available
only on a quarterly basis and only as far back
as 1947. On the other hand, movements in GNP
and industrial production are highly correlated,
with correlations of 0.998 using annual data
and 0.964 using quarterly data.7 Also, industrial
production is a component of the index of
coincident indicators, which is explicitly
designed to have turning points that are the
same as those of the business cycle.
Is there a bounce-back effect?
A useful first pass at answering the question
of whether severe recessions are followed by
strong recoveries is, simply, to plot the data.
Figure 1 presents a scatter plot of the percentage
change in output in each of the 14 recessions
since 1919 (except the 1990–91 recession) against
output growth in the first twelve months of the
subsequent expansion, using the NBER business-
cycle dates. A 135-degree line is included for
reference. The scatter of points in Figure 1
certainly suggests the existence of some degree
of correlation between the decline in industrial
production over the course of a recession and
growth in the first twelve months of an expan-
sion. Obviously, the Great Depression (August
1929–March 1933) is very influential in suggesting
the existence of a self-correcting mechanism, but
it is clear that more is going on.8
This simple ocular analysis of the data sug-
gests that there is a correlation between the peak-
to-trough decline in output over the course of
recession and growth in the early stages of the
subsequent recovery. Let us now turn to testing
and quantifying the strength of this correlation.
Empirical analysis
Our strategy for testing for the existence of
a bounce-back effect was to estimate a simple
linear regression model of the form
Figure 1
Peak-to-Trough Change in Output and Output
Growth, as Measured by Industrial Production
(NBER Business-Cycle Dates)
Output growth in first
12 months of recovery
(Percent)
7 Correlations were calculated using annual data for 1929–90
and quarterly data for 1947–90.
8 The recovery from the Great Depression of 1929–33 has
recently been examined in some detail by Romer (1991).
The specific question she addresses is, What proportion of
the extraordinary rates of real GNP growth observed in the
mid-1930s and late 1930s can be attributed to the severity
of the downturn, and what proportion can be attributed to
monetary and fiscal stimuli to aggregate demand? She
finds that stimulative monetary policy in the form of
unsterilized gold inflows played a key role in the recovery,
and she concludes that her findings suggest that “any self-
corrective response of the U.S. economy to low output was
weak or non-existent in the 1930s” (p. 1). The role of activist
fiscal and monetary policy in generating vigorous recover-
ies is an issue we do not address directly in this article.
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where Y is some measure of output, T denotes
the month of a business-cycle trough as determined
by some business-cycle chronology, P denotes the
month of a business-cycle peak, i indexes reces-
sions, and  is an error term.9 The dependent
variable is the percentage increase in output in
the twelve months after the trough month.10 The
explanatory variables, apart from the constant, are
the peak-to-trough change in output in percentage
terms and the length of the recession in months.
Table 2
Rate of Growth During First Twelve Months of Recovery
Change
from peak Length of
Constant to trough recession ⎯ R 2
Industrial 8.24** –.63*** — .64
production (2.79) (.13)
6.27 –.47** .34 .65
(3.25) (.19) (.30)
Manufacturing 9.13** –.62*** — .58
(3.35) (.14)
5.19 –.35* .63* .66
(3.58) (.19) (.31)
Durables –.69 –1.31*** — .68
manufacturing (8.22) (.24)
–10.50 –.83** 1.61** .77
(8.24) (.29) (.70)
Nondurables 9.00*** –.42*** — .59
manufacturing (1.16) (.10)
6.90*** –.24* .26* .66
(1.51) (.13) (.13)
* Significant at the 10-percent level.
** Significant at the 5-percent level.
*** Significant at the 1-percent level.
NOTE: All data were seasonally adjusted. The sample period is January 1919–December 1991, which includes 14 recessions,
not counting the 1990–91 recession. Peak and trough dates are from the official NBER business-cycle chronology.
The dependent variable is the rate of growth during the first twelve months of recovery (defined as trough to trough
plus twelve months).
Figures in parentheses are standard errors.
9 In Balke and Wynne (1992), we estimate a slightly different
model that allows us to distinguish between three measures
of the severity of a recession—length, depth, and steep-
ness. Moore (1961, 86) notes that recessions have at least
three dimensions—”depth, duration, and diffusion.” We do
not consider diffusion as a measure of severity in this article,
primarily because of the degrees-of-freedom problem.
10 Looking at growth beyond twelve months is complicated by
the fact that for three of the recessions in our sample, the
subsequent expansion lasted twelve months or less.Economic Review — First Quarter 1993 7
If deep recessions are followed by strong recover-
ies, the estimate of 1 should be negative. If long
recessions are followed by strong recoveries, the
estimate of 2 should be positive.
Table 2 reports estimates of this model using
the Federal Reserve’s industrial production index
and its three principal components—total manu-
facturing, durables manufacturing, and nondurables
manufacturing. Results are reported both with and
without the length-of-recession variable on the
right-hand side. The sample includes 14 recessions,
starting with the January 1920–July 1921 recession
and ending with the July 1981–November 1982
recession, as determined by the NBER business-
cycle chronology. For each production category,
there is a statistically significant relationship
between the size of the peak-to-trough decline
and growth in the twelve months after the trough.
The size of the bounce-back effect is strongest for
durables manufacturing. Recession length makes
no difference to the strength of the recovery in
total industrial production but does seem to be
important for manufacturing. Within manufacturing,
recovery in the durable goods sector seems to be
more affected by the length of the recession than
is the recovery in the nondurables sector. For all
Table 3
Rate of Growth During First Twelve Months of Recovery,
Excluding the Great Depression
Change
from peak Length of
Constant to trough recession ⎯ R 2
Industrial 9.72** –.51** — .35
production (3.22) (.19)
6.26 –.47** .34 .31
(6.73) (.20) (.57)
Manufacturing 11.51** –.43** — .25
(3.64) (.19)
2.99 –.36* .81 .30
(7.39) (.19) (.62)
Durables 5.52 –.97*** — .43
manufacturing (8.62) (.31)
–16.19 –.84** 2.09 .48
(16.88) (.31) (1.42)
Nondurables 9.61*** –.28** — .29
manufacturing (1.12) (.12)
7.69 –.24 .19 .25
(3.09) (.14) (.28)
* Significant at the 10-percent level.
** Significant at the 5-percent level.
*** Significant at the 1-percent level.
NOTE: All data were seasonally adjusted. The sample period is January 1919–December 1991, which includes 14 recessions,
not counting the 1990–91 recession. Peak and trough dates are from the official NBER business-cycle chronology.
The dependent variable is the rate of growth during the first twelve months of recovery (defined as trough to trough
plus twelve months).
Figures in parentheses are standard errors.Federal Reserve Bank of Dallas 8
sectors, including the length of the recession as an
additional variable on the right-hand side lessens
the bounce-back effect but does not eliminate it.
Because the sample period includes the
Great Depression, one of the most severe contrac-
tions ever in U.S. economic activity, the results in
Table 2 may be overly influenced by this extraor-
dinary event. Table 3 reports results from estima-
tion of equation 1 when the Great Depression is
excluded from the sample. As might be expected,
there is some loss of statistical significance, but
the results are broadly similar to those in Table 2.
The length of the recession is no longer signifi-
cant in explaining growth during the first twelve
months of recovery. This is not too surprising,
because the Great Depression, with forty-three
months from peak to trough, is by far the longest
recession in the period covered by our analysis.11
How robust are the results?
How robust are our findings of a bounce-
back effect? We have already examined the sensi-
tivity of the findings to the inclusion of the Great
Depression in the sample and have seen that the
results are not sensitive to its exclusion. In this
section, we will consider the robustness of our
results to a variety of other potential criticisms.
First, we will consider growth over horizons other
than the twelve months after the trough date.
Specifically, we will consider whether growth in
the first six months of an expansion is also signifi-
cantly related to the severity of the preceding
recession. Second, we will increase the number of
recessions we look at by examining the behavior
of an alternative industrial production index con-
structed by Miron and Romer (1990) that covers
the period 1884–1940. We also consider the
behavior of this index when it is spliced to the
Federal Reserve production index in 1919. Finally,
we consider the sensitivity of our results to use
of the official NBER chronology by looking at the
dates suggested by Romer (1992) and the dates
obtained using the algorithm developed by Bry
and Boschan (1971).
The bounce-back effect at the six-month
horizon. To examine whether the bounce-back
effect can be found at the six-month horizon as
well, we estimated an obvious variant on equation
1, redefining the dependent variable to be growth
in the first six months after the trough. The results
are reported in Table 4. We only report the results
obtained when length of recession is not included
in the model, as the significance of this variable
seems to hinge completely on including the Great
Depression in the sample. Growth in the first six
months of the recovery is significantly correlated
with the peak-to-trough change in activity, but
excluding the Great Depression from the sample
seems to reduce the strength of the correlation a
lot more than we find for growth over the twelve-
month horizon.
The bounce-back effect in the Miron–Romer
industrial production series. It is possible to
extend the sample period further to include the
period before World War I by using the industrial
production index recently constructed by Miron
and Romer (1990). Their index covers the period
1884–1940, overlapping with the Federal Reserve
index for twenty-one years, from 1919 to 1940.
This period of overlap includes five recessions.
The Miron–Romer index was designed to improve
upon the older Babson and Persons indexes, which
made heavy use of indirect proxies for industrial
activity (such as imports and exports in the case
of the Babson index and bank clearings in the
case of the Persons index). Miron and Romer note
that their series has turning points (that is, peaks
and troughs) that are “grossly similar to but subtly
different from existing series” (p. 321).
The Miron–Romer index is less comprehen-
sive than the Federal Reserve index and, according
to the NBER chronology, produces two anomalous
observations. Specifically, the Miron–Romer index
shows industrial production increasing in two
of the pre–World War I recessions, the recessions
of December 1895–June 1897 and September
1902–August 1904. This finding can be interpreted
as a drawback of the series or as suggesting a
need to reconsider the dating of pre–World War I
business cycles by using the improved index.
11 The Great Depression is not, however, the longest reces-
sion in the NBER chronology. The longest U.S. recession on
record was from October 1873 to March 1879, lasting sixty-
five months. This recession is not included in our analysis
because reliable measures of aggregate production at the
required frequency are not available that far back.Economic Review — First Quarter 1993 9
The results from estimating the model by using
the Miron–Romer index are reported in Table 5.
The first four rows of this table report the results
obtained using the raw (not seasonally adjusted)
series. Again, we find evidence of a significant
bounce-back effect in industrial production. The
inclusion of recession length as an additional ex-
planatory variable makes no difference to this find-
ing, nor does excluding the Great Depression.
Table 5 also reports the results of combining the
Federal Reserve and Miron–Romer indexes (season-
ally adjusted). We followed Romer (1992) in splicing
the two series in 1919 to obtain a single series on
industrial production for the period 1884–1990. This
gives us a sample of 24 recessions for examining
the bounce-back effect. The principal difference
between these results and those in Tables 3 and 4
is that length of recession is no longer significant in
Table 4
Rate of Growth During First Six Months of Recovery
Change
from peak
Constant to trough ⎯ R 2
Including the Great Depression
Industrial .39 –.63*** .62
production (3.11) (.14)
Manufacturing .71 –.65*** .61
(3.51) (.15)
Durables –7.90 –1.08*** .61
manufacturing (8.45) (.25)
Nondurables 2.68** –.68*** .81
manufacturing (1.15) (.10)
Excluding the Great Depression
Industrial 4.12 –.32* .25
production (2.94) (.17)
Manufacturing 4.82 –.32* .25
(3.17) (.17)
Durables 3.91 –.44* .29
manufacturing (5.78) (.21)
Nondurables 3.48*** –.49*** .67
manufacturing (.99) (.11)
* Significant at the 10-percent level.
** Significant at the 5-percent level.
*** Significant at the 1-percent level.
NOTE: All data were seasonally adjusted. The sample period is January 1919–December 1991,
which includes 14 recessions, not counting the 1990–91 recession. Peak and trough dates
are from the official NBER business-cycle chronology. The dependent variable is the rate
of growth during the first six months of recovery (defined as trough to trough plus six months).
Figures in parentheses are standard errors.Federal Reserve Bank of Dallas 10
explaining the strength of the recovery, even when
the Great Depression is included in the sample.
The bounce-back effect in alternative business-
cycle chronologies. Romer (1992) has questioned
whether the dates for the prewar cycles in the
official NBER chronology are strictly comparable
to those for the postwar period. Romer documents
evidence that the prewar dates are based on
detrended data while the postwar dates reflect
cycles in unadjusted data. Consequently, the prewar
NBER chronology tends to overstate the length of
contractions and understate the length of expan-
sions. Romer corrects the NBER chronology by
formalizing the rule that the NBER used in dating
the postwar cycles and applying it to industrial
production for the prewar period to come up
Table 5
Rate of Growth During First Twelve Months of Recovery:
Results Using the Miron–Romer Index
Change
from peak Length of Number of
Constant to trough recession ⎯ R 2 recessions
Miron–Romer Index
Including the 12.48** –.79*** — .50 15
Great Depression (4.80) (.20)
9.39 –.76*** .20 .47 15
(9.86) (.23) (.55)
Excluding the 12.42** –.82*** — .45 14
Great Depression (5.00) (.24)
.16 –.82*** .77 .44 14
(15.03) (.24) (.89)
Combined Federal Reserve/Miron–Romer Index
Including the 9.62*** –.65*** — .54 24
Great Depression (2.17) (.12)
6.10 –.60*** .27 .55 24
(3.71) (.13) (.23)
Excluding the 9.94*** –.60** — .38 23
Great Depression (2.30) (.16)
3.99 –.64*** .40 .39 23
(5.73) (.16) (.35)
* Significant at the 10-percent level.
** Significant at the 5-percent level.
*** Significant at the 1-percent level.
NOTE: Peak and trough dates are from the official NBER business-cycle chronology. The dependent variable is the rate of growth
during the first twelve months of recovery (defined as trough to trough plus twelve months).
Estimates in the first four rows were obtained using the non-seasonally-adjusted Miron–Romer index. The sample period is
January 1884–December 1940, which includes 15 recessions. Estimates in the second four rows were obtained using the
combined Federal Reserve/Miron–Romer series, which is seasonally adjusted, not counting the 1990–91 recession. The
sample period is January 1884–December 1991, which includes 24 recessions.
Figures in parentheses are standard errors.Economic Review — First Quarter 1993 11
with an alternative set of dates.12 These dates are
shown in Table 6. One key difference with the
official NBER dates (reproduced in Table 6 for ease
of comparison) is that the average length of pre–
World War II contractions is shorter (11.4 months,
as opposed to 17.8 months in the NBER chronol-
ogy), and the average length of pre–World War II
expansions is longer (30.3 months, as opposed to
24.9 months in the NBER chronology).13 The two
chronologies are in agreement for only two reces-
Table 6
Alternative Prewar Business-Cycle Chronologies
NBER dates Romer dates Bry–Boschan dates
Peak Trough Peak Trough Peak Trough
March 1887 April 1888 February 1887 July 1887 — —
July 1890 May 1891 — — November 1891 September 1893
January 1893 June 1894 January 1893 April 1894 — —
December 1895 June 1897 December 1895 January 1897 October 1895 August 1896
— — — — April 1897 June 1898
June 1899 December 1900 April 1900 December 1900 April 1900 October 1900
— — — — August 1901 June 1902
September 1902 August 1904 July 1903 March 1904 — —
May 1907 June 1908 July 1907 June 1908 — —
January 1910 January 1912 January 1910 May 1911 February 1910 December 1910
January 1913 December 1914 June 1914 November 1914 December 1912 January 1914
— — May 1916 January 1917 — —
August 1918 March 1919 July 1918 March 1919 May 1918 March 1919
January 1920 July 1921 January 1920 July 1921 January 1920 March 1921
May 1923 July 1924 May 1923 July 1924 May 1923 June 1924
October 1926 November 1927 March 1927 December 1927 March 1927 December 1927
August 1929 March 1933 September 1929 July 1932 May 1929 July 1932
May 1937 June 1938 August 1937 June 1938 May 1937 June 1938
— — December 1939 March 1940 — —
SOURCES: Moore and Zarnowitz (1986), Tables A.3, A.5.
Romer (1992), Table 3.
Authors’ calculations.
12 This rule is explained in the Appendix.
13 Note that these statistics compare the average length of
contractions and expansions during the period for which
the two chronologies overlap. The statistics on the average
length of prewar contractions and expansions reported in
Table 1 are the averages over all contractions and expan-
sions in the NBER chronology for the prewar period.Federal Reserve Bank of Dallas 12
sions, those of 1920–21 and 1923–24. They are
also in agreement on either the peak or the trough
dates for a number of other recessions. Finally,
note that Romer’s chronology excludes one reces-
sion that is included in the NBER chronology, the
1890–91 recession, while including two others that
are omitted from the NBER chronology, those in
1916–17 and 1939–40. One other noteworthy
feature of Romer’s chronology is that she dates
the trough of the Great Depression in July 1932,
which shortens the length of that downturn from
forty-three months to thirty-four months.
Table 6 also contains business-cycle dates
obtained from application of the algorithm devised
by Bry and Boschan (1971) to industrial production
for the entire period.14 The Bry–Boschan algorithm
is somewhat more complex than the rule devised
by Romer and picks slightly different cycles from
those picked by Romer and those in the official
NBER chronology. The Bry–Boschan algorithm
picks two cycles (1897–98 and 1901–2) that are not
included in the NBER chronology and misses four
(1887, 1893–94, 1903–4, and 1907–8) that are. The
Bry–Boschan algorithm also misses the 1916–17
and 1939–40 cycles, two cycles picked by the Romer
algorithm but not included in the NBER chronology.
The algorithm does capture some of the same peak
and trough dates as the Romer algorithm and the
NBER chronology. Interestingly, the Bry–Boschan
algorithm places the trough of the Great Depres-
sion in July 1932 (the same as Romer) but dates
its onset in May 1929, four months earlier than
Romer and three months earlier than the NBER.
Table 7 reports the results of estimating equa-
tion 1 with the Romer and Bry–Boschan business-
cycle dates. For consistency, we used the dates
picked by these algorithms for the postwar period
as well, rather than the NBER dates. The differences
between the three chronologies for the postwar
period are minor, as both the Romer and Bry–
Boschan algorithms are designed to match as
closely as possible the NBER dating for this period.
Both chronologies suggest a statistically significant
bounce-back effect. In every case, the coefficient
estimate on the change in output from peak to
trough is significant at the 1-percent level. The
length of the recession is not significant in either
chronology, even when the Great Depression is
included. Excluding the Great Depression does
significantly lower the explanatory power of the
basic model, as indicated by the drop in the  R 2,
and the size of the bounce-back effect, as indi-
cated by the drop in the absolute value of the
coefficient estimate, but does not eliminate it.
To summarize, our finding of a bounce-back
effect in industrial production is common to a variety
of measures of industrial production, is found at
the six-month as well as the twelve-month horizon,
and is robust to potential shortcomings in the NBER
chronology for the prewar period. Some other
robustness tests (such as controlling for secular
trend) are reported in Balke and Wynne (1992)
and reinforce those reported here. The robustness
of the bounce-back effect merits taking it seriously
as a stylized fact about the business cycle.
The economics of the bounce-back effect
Having established the existence of a bounce-
back effect, we should provide an economic inter-
pretation of what is going on. We argue that the
bounce-back effect tells us more about the dynamic
response of the economy to shocks than about
the nature or source of shocks themselves. Three
simple observations about the behavior of firms
and households help in understanding macro-
economic dynamics. First, households and firms
not only look at current economic conditions when
deciding how much to work, save, consume, and
invest but also take into consideration the likely
course of economic activity in the future. Second,
households prefer continuity in their consumption
patterns from year to year, rather than wild move-
ments. And third, saving and investment decisions
made today have implications for what can be
done tomorrow through their effect on capital
accumulation, just as decisions made yesterday
have implications for what can be done today. The
bounce-back effect is a manifestation of the dynamic
response of the economy, as a result of these three
factors, to a shock that brings about a recession.
One interpretation of what happens when
the economy goes into recession is that the maxi-
mum level of output that can be attained with
14 The Bry–Boschan algorithm is described briefly in the
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existing resources of capital and labor temporarily
falls. Such a change might come about, for example,
as a result of a temporary increase in oil prices.
This is the type of shock typically emphasized in
New Classical real business cycle models. Or
alternatively, a coordination failure results in pro-
ductive resources becoming idle and output falling
below potential. This story is more characteristic
of New Keynesian analyses of the causes of reces-
sions. During the period of lower output, house-
holds try to maintain their consumption levels by
saving less. Part of this behavior translates into
less investment by businesses and reduced pur-
chases of consumer durables by households. The
result of these spending decisions of households
and firms is that when the economy hits the trough,
stocks of business capital and household capital
are below their “normal,” or desired long-run, levels.
This discrepancy between actual and normal levels
of capital is then associated with an investment
boom and an increase in purchases of consumer
durables when the economy turns the corner. In
some cases, the discrepancy in and of itself can
be enough to bring a recession to an end and set
Table 7
Results Using Alternative Business-Cycle Chronologies
Change
from peak Length of Number of
Constant to trough recession ⎯ R 2 recessions
Romer Dating
Including the 7.01* –.90*** –.03 .59 25
Great Depression (3.60) (.18) (.33)
6.81** –.89*** — .61 25
(2.53) (.14)
Excluding the 12.55** –.73*** –.40 .35 24
Great Depression (4.60) (.20) (.38)
8.67*** –.70*** — .34 24
(2.78) (.19)
Bry–Boschan Dating
Including the –1.09 –.71*** .46 .71 21
Great Depression (3.60) (.18) (.33)
2.05 –.90*** — .69 21
(2.89) (.13)
Excluding the 8.69* –.60*** –.17 .38 20
Great Depression (4.90) (.17) (.37)
6.93** –.57*** — .41 20
(2.87) (.15)
* Significant at the 10-percent level.
** Significant at the 5-percent level.
*** Significant at the 1-percent level.
NOTE: All data were seasonally adjusted. The sample period is January 1884–December 1991, which includes 25 recessions in
the Romer chronology and 21 recessions in the Bry–Boschan chronology. The dependent variable is the rate of growth
during the first twelve months of recovery (defined as trough to trough plus twelve months).
Figures in parentheses are standard errors.Federal Reserve Bank of Dallas 14
the expansion in motion. The larger the discrep-
ancy between actual and normal capital stocks at
the trough, the faster the economy will grow in
the months after the trough because of the greater
amount of ground that has to be regained.
This explanation merely touches on some
of the key elements of the more fully articulated
theories essential for a complete understanding of
the business cycle. In Balke and Wynne (1992), we
carry out a detailed analysis of a prototypical real
business cycle model and find that it performs
reasonably well in generating the bounce-back
phenomenon but does not capture other features
of the business cycle.
Examination of the 1991–92 recovery
The most recent business-cycle peak was in
July 1990. If we date the trough of this cycle as May
1991, as many analysts are doing (although the
official trough date has yet to be announced by the
NBER), the peak-to-trough decline in industrial pro-
duction amounts to 3.6 percent. Industrial produc-
tion bottomed out in March 1991, after declining
5.0 percent since July 1990. This compares favor-
ably with either the average decline of 17.1 percent
for all the recessions covered by the Federal Reserve’s
index of industrial production or the average decline
of 8.8 percent for the post–World War II recessions.
Based on our estimates in Table 2, we would expect
industrial production to have grown 10.5 percent—
8.24 – (0.63)(–3.6)—from the tentative trough date
in May 1991 through May 1992. In fact, industrial
production grew only 2.3 percent over this period,
substantially less than the rate predicted by our
simple model. If we take the actual peaks and
troughs in industrial production, the decline from
September 1990 to March 1991 is 5.2 percent, and
predicted cumulative growth in industrial produc-
tion from March 1991 to March 1992 is 11.5 per-
cent—8.24 – (0.63)(–5.2)—as opposed to a realized
rate of 2.5 percent. Thus, our bounce-back equa-
tion dramatically overpredicts the strength of the
recovery, suggesting that the present recovery is
abnormally slow, even after taking into account
the shallowness of the recession.
However, because of the historical variability
of the growth rate of industrial production during
recoveries, the current recovery is still well within
the 95-percent confidence interval implied by the
bounce-back model. For the forecast growth rate
over the twelve months since May 1991, the standard
error associated with the forecast is 6.9 percentage
points. This means that based on the coefficient
estimates in Table 2, the 95-percent confidence
interval associated with the forecast value of the
growth rate of industrial production from May 1991
to May 1992 is 10.5 ± (1.96)(6.9)—that is, from –3.0
percent to 24.0 percent. Thus, the current recovery,
while substantially weaker than predicted, is none-
theless consistent with the bounce-back model.
An alternative perspective on how this recovery
compares with others is given in Figure 2. This
figure is a scatter plot of the peak-to-trough decline
in industrial production over the course of reces-
sion against growth in the first twelve months of
the recovery, with the recessions and recoveries
now ranked in order of severity and strength. Thus,
SOURCES OF PRIMARY DATA:
Board of Governors, Federal Reserve System.
Moore and Zarnowitz (1986).
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Figure 2
Rank Ordering of Recessions and Recoveries,
as Measured by Industrial Production
(NBER Business-Cycle Dates)
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the horizontal axis ranks recessions in order of
severity, with 1 being the least severe and 15 being
the most severe. The vertical axis ranks recoveries
in terms of their strength, with 1 being the least
strong and 15 being the most strong. That the
points are clustered around the 45-degree line is
simply another way of demonstrating the bounce-
back effect: typically, severe recessions are followed
by strong recoveries. As we saw in Figure 1, the
most severe recession in the sample covered by
the Federal Reserve’s industrial production index,
the Great Depression, was also followed by the
most robust recovery in that sample. What we see
from Figure 2 is that the 1990–91 recession was
the least severe since 1919 in terms of the decline
in industrial production and, also, the recovery in
the twelve months since the tentative trough date
of May 1991 is the weakest since 1919. In other
words, the behavior of the industrial sector in the
most recent recession and recovery episode is
very much in line with historical experience.
It cannot be emphasized strongly enough
that this article focuses on the behavior of the
industrial sector in recessions and recoveries. In
terms of broader measures of aggregate activity,
such as total nonagricultural employment or GNP,
the picture is somewhat different. While the most
recent recession may have been one of the least
severe in U.S. history in terms of the decline in
industrial production, it is close to the postwar
average in terms of the decline in GNP. As for the
recovery, GNP growth over the year since the tenta-
tive trough date of May 1991 is the weakest in the
postwar period. Moreover, while the decline in
manufacturing employment between July 1990 and
May 1991 was the smallest in the postwar period,
the twelve-month period after May 1991 is the only
postwar “recovery” in which manufacturing employ-
ment declined. Outside the manufacturing sector,
service-sector employment posted its weakest
increase of any postwar recession except the
1957–58 recession—the only postwar recession in
which service-sector employment declined. In the
twelve months since May 1991, service-sector
employment has grown less than in any other
postwar recovery.
The 1990–91 recession and recovery episode
generated many puzzles for policymakers that are
not yet fully understood. With the passage of time,
our understanding of what happened will grow.
The sluggish pace of the overall recovery remains
a puzzle, but the relatively modest growth in
industrial output is consistent with the bounce-
back effect that we have shown to be characteris-
tic of previous recessions.
Conclusions
In this article, we have examined how rapidly
industrial production recovers in the twelve months
after a business-cycle trough. We considered two
variables as candidates to explain differences in
growth rates between recoveries—the depth and
the length of the preceding recession. We found a
statistically significant relationship between the rate
of growth of output in the twelve months after a
business-cycle trough and the size of the decline
in output from peak to trough. Furthermore, the
bounce-back effect appears to be stronger in
durables manufacturing than in nondurables manu-
facturing. The existence of this bounce-back effect
does not depend on including the Great Depres-
sion in our sample. However, the length of the
recession makes a difference for the strength of the
subsequent recovery only if the recovery following
the Great Depression is included in the sample.
In Balke and Wynne (1992), we have
examined the bounce-back effect in greater detail
and have shown that a similar phenomenon seems
to characterize the behavior of the Group of Seven
countries in the postwar period. In that paper, we
also look at the “shape” of cyclical movements
in various aggregates and document significant
asymmetries between expansions and contrac-
tions. In addition, we explore the implications of
these findings for some common (linear) statistical
and economic models of industrial output.
Given the relative robustness of our finding
of a bounce-back effect for the industrial sector, it
is important to ask whether the effect characterizes
the 1990–91 recession and recovery. If we take
May 1991 as the trough date marking the end of
the most recent recession, the decline in industrial
output from peak to trough was 3.6 percent, making
it one of the mildest recessions in terms of lost
industrial production. And consistent with the
bounce-back effect, the growth in industrial pro-
duction since May 1991 has been the weakest
recovery in the period covered by the Federal
Reserve index of industrial production.Federal Reserve Bank of Dallas 16
Romer’s rules for dating cycles by using
industrial production
1. A fluctuation counts as a cycle if the
cumulative loss in the log of output
between the peak and the return to
peak exceeds 0.44—that is, 44 per-
centage-point months of output.
2. The second or later of multiple ex-
tremes is chosen as the turning point
if the cumulative loss or gain in output
is less than 0.11.
3. The first month after a peak or trough
counts as a horizontal stretch if the
cumulative loss or gain in output is
less than 0.008.
The Bry–Boschan algorithm for picking
turning points in a time series
1. Eliminate extreme values of raw se-
ries (greater than ± 3.5 standard de-
viations) and replace by values from a
Spencer curve. A Spencer curve is a
symmetric filter with declining weights.
2. Calculate a twelve-month moving av-
erage with the adjusted series. Find
the local maximums and minimums.
Use dates as tentative peak and trough
dates, being sure that peaks and
troughs alternate.
Appendix
Rules for Dating Business Cycles
3. Calculate a Spencer curve with the
adjusted series. Find the highest (low-
est) values of Spencer curves within
five months of the peaks (troughs)
identified from the twelve-month mov-
ing average. Be sure that the new
peak and trough dates alternate and
that cycle duration is at least fifteen
months.
4. Calculate a four-month moving aver-
age with the adjusted series. Identify
the highest (lowest) values within five
months of the peaks (troughs) identi-
fied from the Spencer curve. Be sure
that the peak and trough dates alter-
nate and that cycle duration is at least
fifteen months.
5. Using the raw series, adjusted for
extremes, find the highest (lowest)
values within four months of the peaks
(troughs) identified from the four-
month moving average. Be sure that
no peak or trough is within six months
of the beginning or end of the sample,
that peaks and troughs alternate, that
cycle duration is at least fifteen months,
and that expansion and contraction
phases are at least five months long.
The resulting peak and trough dates
represent the final turning points.Economic Review — First Quarter 1993 17
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